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The South African War represents the most intense conflict between Europeans 
in sub-Saharan Afrioa, involving in only thirty-two months over half a million 
coinbatmts. The W=, however, has been interpmted by histoxiaula exclusively as a 
"white man's waru, in which only the interests and actions of -Fne white comaunities in 
South Africa m d  the Imperial power directly involved, Britain, have been researched 
in any depth. Throughout the pages of the numerous accounts of the conflict, from 
the earliest accounts of military operations published in 1900 to the most recent 
Afrikaans and mli s h  monographs, the participation of black peoples in the war, the 
influence of war on African societies, and the response by Africans to the conflict, 
have been passed over almost completely. The need to study issues such as these is of 
importance not only to a more complete understanding of the war itself, as Donald 
Denoon has recently suggested (l), but, since war represents one of the most powerful 
agents of social change, also to provide information concerning the c m n t s  of c m  
within South African societies at the turn of the present century and the ww in which 
these were influenced by the circumstance of war, especially those trends affecting 
the incorporation of the indigenous peoples of the mgion into a society fast ckwaging 
as a result of the development of the diamond and gold mining industries. In this 
paper I shall examine the role played by black workers during the war a d  the way in 
which the conflict affected their interests, paying particular attention to the 
disruption of the migrant labour system at the outbreak of war, tne labour policies of 
the two armies, the pattern of recruitment of black workers, and the immediate post- 
war labour market. 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century the expansion of the gold 
mining industry was accompanied by a considerable increase in the scale of African 
labour migration to the Witwatersrand. In 1890 the number of African workers employed 
on the gold mines was 15,000; by 1895 the labour force had r~iaen to 50,000, and by 
1899 this had more than doubled to 107,000. (2) The migration of African workers to 
the mines can be related to the fiscal pressures on Africans to acquire cash for taxes 
and rents and to provide for new consumption requirements (the role of the trader- 
recruiter being especially important in this respect), and the increasing difficulties 
experienced by many Africans in meeting their cash needs throu.& the sale of 
arnicultural produce and livestock. (3) The rinderpest epidemic which swept throughotlt 
southern Africa during 1896-97, destroying eighty per cent or more of African cattle, 
appears either to have terminated effectively many Africans' independence from the 
labour system or to have provided a fresh incentive to acquire cash with which to 
purchase stock to rebuild depleted herds. (4) The migration of workers to the mines 
was also stimulated by the increased intensity of recruitment after the establishment 
of the W d  Native Labour Association in 1896, and by the conclusion of an agreement 
with the Governor-General for Mozambique in the following year which permitted licensed 
labour agents for the industry to recruit workers systematically from the Portuguese 
territory. At the outbreak of the South African War, workers from Mo~ambique 
constituted almost two-thirds of the entire black work force on the gold mines. (5) 
Until 1897 the supply of workers to the mines failed to keep pace with the expansion 
of mining operations, and during this period the mining companies were compelled to 
pay their workers more attractive wages than were available elsewhere. In 1893 the 
average monthly wage of black mine labourers rose from 42s to 488, and two years later 
increased to 63s. (6) In 1897, however, the supply of workers exceeded the immediate 
demand, and a revised wage schedule was introduced which reduced the average monthly 
wage to 50s. (7) 
The depletion of the hnd labour force b e p  some months before the outbreak 
of the South African War. As early as in June 1899, labour representatives were 
obliged to send messengers along the line of reef +,o allay the anxiety of African 
workers who feared they would be prevented from returning home by seemingly imminent 
~ 
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military operations. (8) At the beginning of October a rapid exodus of workers from 
the industrial region took place. On one day, October 9, 3,000 workers from Mozambiqne 
were despatched by train to Lourengo Marques, and a fusther 1,300 labourers issued wi+h 
travelling passes to return home by whatever means were available to them. (9) The 
arrival of so many workers at Lourenqo Marques caused the Portuguese administration 
difficulties in accommodating the migrants; temporary camps were established and 
troops held in readiness to deal with any signs of disorder. (10) The office of 
J. S. Marwick, the Natal Native Agent in Johannesburg, was surrounded by thousands 
of African workers, aware that no armngements had been made for their return home 
and anxious lest their earnings be confiscated before they left the Republic. (11) l 
Marwick successfully negotiated with the Pretoria government for permission to march I 
the remaining workers from Natal to the frontier of the Colony. (12) The almost l 
total suspension of gold production on the Rand not only stemmed the southward 
migration of labour from south-central Africa but also reversed it to some extent. 
In November 1899 large numbers of "boys1' from the gold mines were reported passing 
through the Bechuanaland Protectorate to work on the mines in Southern Rhodesia (13), 
and during the war Africans from Basutoland, Bechuanaland and the Tramkei were found 
working there. (14) 
Many workers experienced considerable hardship. Those engaged by De Beers 
at Kimberley were swiftly encircled by the Republican forces, and though many 
successfully escaped investment, 18,000 workers were compelled to endue the 
subsequent five month sietp. Because the Company's supply of fresh vegetables was 
taken over by the military for general European consumption, scurvy soon spread in 
the compounds: in January 1900, 260 deaths among the workers occurred, and during 
the following month 2,000 cases of scurvy were reported to be under observation. (15) 
There are m a n y  reports of African workers who left the Transvaal having been robbed 
of their earnings by Boer commandos and railway officials. (16) Labourers from all 
regions of southern Africa were often compelled to leave the Rand by the Delasa Bay 
railway route, and a number of workers perished on the journey home. (17) Some 
workers returning home from the Rand and the coal mines of Natal, evacuated on account I l 
of the Boer invasion of the Colony, were detained by the British amqy in the districts 
placed under immediate martial law. In the Transkei workers were described as having 
returned "in a state of absolute destitution, great numbers having walked from 
imbility to pay railway fares, and emaciated from want of foodf1. (18) The disruption 
to the migrant labour system increased the pressure on food resources in the rural 
areas, especially in Natal, Zululand and the Transkei, where the unprecedented influx 
of population was accompanied by especially meagre harvest yields. Supplies of food 
were short during the first year of the war in the Entonjaneni, Bkandla and Nqutu 
districts of Zululand, and in some regions of northern Natal, where the laying waste 
of crops by military operations was an additional cause of distress. (19) In Nqutu, 
the Rev. C. Johnson described a "terrible famine" existing in the area, caused 
initially by a disappointing harvest but exacerbated by "having so many more people 
to feedv. (20) In Britain, the Aboriginest Protection Society established a Zululand 
Relief Fund which raised E500 to buy food for distribution in the most distressed 
areas. (21) Althow the Natal government and the Colonial Office considered the 
Societyfs action unnecessary (22), the situation was sufficiently serious to induce 
the Department of Native Affairs to set up a relief committee with responsibility for 
purchasing mealies and allocating them to the worst affected areas. (23) In the 
T m k e i ,  the government was also compelled to administer relief in the Butterworth 
and Willowvale districts, where between four hundred and five hundred Africans received 
&ily rations of llb mealies. (24) The distress which resulted from the return. of so 
inayly workers ia evidencre of the extent to which some communities in the Transkei ancl 
ZuLuland had alrsady become dependent on the absence of men at work, avld the money 
these migrants earned, to provide subsistence. 
Throughout the campaign in South Africa, the British army depended on African 
labow: for messengers, scouts, harness-menders, policemen, guards over supplies, and 
ox-dl:$vexs; for the heavy earthworks connected with the railways; for loading. and 
off-loading supply trains; for work in the large military camps; and for supervising 
horses in the remount and veterinary departments. In addition, Africans were enrolled 
to defend the Transkei and East Griqualand, and later in the war to transport 
Afrikaner families to the concentration camps, to round up their livestock, and to 
assist in the patrolling of the blockhouse system. (25) The labour requirements of 
the Afrikaner forces during the war were conaiderably less than those of the British 
army, owing to the smaller size, local knowledge and mobility of the Boer units. In 
practice, many c o ~ d o  fighters were accompanied by one or more of their African 
servants or workers, though for certain tasks such as the destruction of xailways and 
the attempted damning of the Klip river during the Ladysmith campaign, on which 500 
labourers were employed, the Boera were able to bring together a large number of African 
workers. 
The labour policy of the Republics, like that of the subsequent British 
military administration, was related not only to the requirements of the military 
forces but to the perceived need to preserve law and order among the black population, 
especially on the Witwatere~rand, where after hostilities began a large pool of 
unemployed labour developed, swelled by many Africans who came into the region to seek 
security from military operations. Another factor to be considered by the governments 
was the need to provide additional Labour to maintain agricultural output, which was 
made more difficult by the absence of farmers and their sons on commando. At the 
outbreak of war, therefore, Africans were conscripted to work on farms and forbidden 
to leave their employers for its duration, and to accompany the commandos as 
labourers, wagon-drivers, leaders of oxen, gun-bearers, and scouts. (26) To refuse 
to serve with the Boer forces was punishable by a fine of £5, by imprisonment, or by 
twenty-five lashes (27), and the methods on conscription employed did not err on the 
side of leniency. In October 1899, the Standard and Diagersl News protested that 
It is tFme the attention of the authorities was drawn 
to the inhuman treatment meted out to the natives in 
town by some of the so-called commandeering officers. 
Lashes are quite common, and, while we are not ultr* 
sentimental, and believe in the native being fimly 
treated, we c m o t  allow cruelty to go by unnoticed, (28) 
Conscription frequently took the form of raids into mining compounds and the 
Johannesburg location, usually on the pretext of searching out those engaged in the 
manufacture of beer, and served the additional purpose of preventing protests by 
Africans against the introduction by the government of a maximum monthly wage for 
African workers of 20s. (29) Despite such action, discontent among Africans on the 
Rand occasionally erupted: in October, two workers at the Driefontein Mine "occupied" 
the underground section, amed with Martini-Henry rifles; in January, between thirty 
and foslty workers at the George Goch location attacked a group of &ite policemen; 
md,dmingYmh, mine police all over the reef engaged in disarming workers of 
knobkemies arad assegais, which on some mines were reported to have been found in 
lage quantitiee. (30) When Robertst S col- entered Johannesburg in June 1900, 
African workers jubilantly burned their passes in relief at the apparent pass* of 
the harsh war;time regime on the Rand and of the danger of conscription by the Boers to 
perform mpaid military labour at the front, It is clear, too, that their action 
symbolized an expectation that the British would introduce a new, more liberal 
labour systq. in the Transvaal. (31) 
In November 1899 the British a m  appointed Colonel E. P. C. Gimuard, axt 
officer experienced in recruiting and organising indigenous labour in the S u h ,  to 
es'tablish. labour depots for the supply of workers to all the departments of the anqy 
except the transport department, which enlisted its own drivers and leaders. The first 
depot was established at De Aari for which recruitment was initially entrusted to 
mgistrates in the Transkei and the Ciskei; workers were enlisted for three months 
m d  paid 60s a month with free rations. Another depot was or&zed at Bloeafontein, 
which was administered on a similar basis, thaw the monthly pay was fixed at 40s 
and recruitment was largely the responsibility of the Resident Conmissioner in 
Basutoland, Sir hdfrey Lagden. On the Witwatersrand., where 35,000 workers remained 
in the mining area, 8,000 were employed by the military on the constmction of a 
rai1wa;y for trimsporting coal along the gold reef at a wage rate of lOd a and 
another 4,000 workers conscripted to form the initial recruitment to the Johmesbwg 
\ labour depot 'at the wage rate of Is a day, these workers being reserved for the gold 
mining industry when production was again able to be fully resumed, Tho ~erninii-lg 
workers were htained by the mining companies for maintenance work at the same rate.(33) 
Further recruitment to the labour depot was entrusted to agents who had fomerly 
recruited workers for the mi&ng industry (33), though the asrqy also used its 
influence to increase its own labour supply. Any Africans in the Witwatersrand regfon 
who appeazed to have no employment, or who were detained eitner for failing to produce 
a pass or suspected of desertion, were conscripted by the military and sent to the 
Johannesburg depot. (34) Those Mricans who had been detained by the previous 
administration suspected of spying were also enmlled. (35) The conscription of 
Africans into-military employment was used as a means of maintaining control over the 
black population; when four hundred Africans at Balmoral were reported by General 
Pole4amw to be "getting out of hand1', the Military Governor, General. lYaxw@ll, 
armanged far them to be transported by rail to Johamesbusg to be enrolled at the 
labour depot. (36) 
l 
The labour policy' of the. British amy also cannot be separated from the 
growing wfug'ee problem which the military administration was compelled to deal with, 
Largely as a result of General Kitchener's 'lscorched earthw policy, which was intended 
to deny the Republican guerrilla groups all means of subsistence by destroying African 
as well as Afrikaner crops and livestock. This policy especially affected Africans 
residi,ng on priva;te farms, a group which made up 22.25 per cent of the African 
population of the Transvaal. (37) During 1901 concentration camps to house Africans 
were established, administered by a Native B e m e  Department, In order to reduce the 
cost of supplying rations to the camps and to provide a reliable supply of workers to 
the military, those Africans cap~ble of work were sent to the various departments of 
the army for employment. (38) The camps were situated along the lines of rail, in 
easy communication with bases of military. operations an& centres where labour was 
required. Rations in the caps were distributed without payment only to those who 
were either physically unfit fortwork or for whom no suitable employment was available. 
Jnevitably, a high proportion of those detained in the refugee camps were obliged to 
accept work.. Captain G. F. de Lotbiniere, the Superintendent of native Refugees, wrote 
in January 1902 that supplying l~bour to the arqy "formed the basis on which our system 
was founded", and it appears probable that the reason why the African refugee canpa, 
unlike the camps for whites, remined under amy supervision, was to keep the control 
of African labour in military hands, a consideration of some Iwportmce since woxksre 
were needed by the m i n i n g  bdustry for the resumption of gold production, the wa~1Eth 
from which represented the keystone of Milner's recouastmction p r o ~ ~ e  in the
Transvaal. (393 By. %he end of the war there were sixty-six Afrfcm~ refugee camps in 
the Transvaal and Orange Biver Colony, housing 107,344 refugees. A high incigence of 
pemonal ~uffering unavoidably took place in the camps: epidemics of chicken-pox, 
measles, dysentery and other diseases attacked the hastily organised sites, owing to 
the overcrowded living conditions, contaminated drinking water, and inadequate 
supplies of food. In December l901 the death rate in the African refugee caaps in 
the Or- River Colony was estimated to be 436 per 1,800, and in the Ismsvaal 320 
per 1,000, (40) 
The British a w ,  however, depended not orily on tlinvoluntargr's labour, but 
also On the volutltary recmtitnent of workers. Xn m a n y  districts there is evidence of 
a direct relationship between the level of nailitary recruitment and insufficient 
harvest yields and the existence of rural unemployment caused by the disruption of the 
labour market at the outbreak of war - in other words, those disltricts where a 
substantial proportion of the inhabitants appear already to have become dependent on 
the migrant labour system for necessary cash reqyirements. In the Bathurst t%.strict 
of the Cape in 1900, where crop yielh were reported to be vesy low, seveaty-two per 
cent of the adult male population were recruited by the military. (41) PeddLe it 
was reporbed that the local food supply was "... practically nil, and rnxqy fmilies 
have been put in dire straits..,. Large numbers were engaged by contra,ot to the 
military authorities to such an extent that few able-bodied men were left"'. (42) 
The initial recruitment to the De Aar depot was concentrated largely in the King  
Williamls Town district, one of those worst affected by harvest diffSculties in 1899- 
1900; during the w m  it was estimated that over 3,000 Africans left the district to 
enrol with the nilitary. (43) The problem in areas suck as these dcwcing the war was 
more than one simply of diminishing means to support a substantial. p m %  of the 
population independently from the labour system, compounded by adverse weatho~ 
conditions anil the influx of men normally absent at work. The demand for p i n  by 
the forces opemting in South Afrioa and the increase in the cost of its transportatiun 
caused by the CO-deering of dra-t a n h l s  by the military. on a considerable scale 
facther inflated the price (large quantities of American wheat were imported through 
East London for sale in the Transkei from lgOO onwards). (44) The commandeering of 
oxen which followed the rinderpest losses only three years earlier also reduced the 
ability of many African communitie,~ to provide sufficient food for their own 
requirements. (45) 
The existence of contrasting prosperity both between and within Africm 
communities was an important feature of South African societies at the turn of the 
present century. During the South African War there existed in all but the xwmo%est 
regions a remunerative market for agricultural produce and livestock, and African 
ag~iculturalists took advantage of the army's demand for animal products, grain, 
tobacco, draughSt animals and remounts, for which they often received considerably 
inflated pricee. (46) Africans best able to do this were those who a1xesd;y supplied 
produce for the market and therefore were in a position to benefit directly fmrn the 
inflation of grain and other prices; those who possesaed the means of transporting 
produce to the areas where troops were quartered and who therebjr cut out the system of 
local entrepreneurs and military contractors; and those who were in a positior, to 
extend their area of cultivation. Pondoland benefited especially fxon the warthe 
produce market, since the war came at a time when a,g-xicultusalists in the region were 
rSO sold already producing a large gcain surplus for the market. (47) Mpondo peasants a1 
-in at hi@ prices - tho- often paid in the form of Livestock - to Africans from 
districts of the Traaskei where resources of food were in short supply.(~f8) In a number 
of areas of the Cape and XTatal, an expansion of the area cultivated by Africans was 
reported, the produce from which was sold on the market; in Ingwavu~a district, 
Zululand, for example, it was noted that "the Natives have increased their hoeing 
operations, with the idea of having a surplus of mealies, mabele, etc., for disposal 
to the whitestf. (49) In a number of regions during the war, however, reports of local 
African prosperity derived from participation in the produce w k e t  occuzmd in 
districts where high levels of military recruitment took place. (50) In some of these 
it is clear that the wealth described was confined to a relatively small section of 
the African comsnunity. In Butterworth, where it was estimated that three out of four 
men were absent at work with the army, and where acute distress was reported 
consistently throu&~out the war, several Africans reaped over a hundred bags of 
mealies and more. (51) In Xalaulga there prospered a community of over a hundred 
African producers who inhabited houses valued from g20 to $600; for the bulk of the 
population, however, supplies of food had been reported for some years to be quite 
inadequate, and during the war five hundred Africans enrolled with the Transkei levies 
and in 1901 llhaddreds" more were said to be in military employment. (52) In Albany a 
small number of Africans ploughed extensively for oats with the specific intention of 
selling oat hay to the military, for which they received 7s per 100 lbs, though large 
numbers of Africans thrown out of work by the outbreak of war  took employment With the 
army as wagoners and mule drivers. (53) It is probable, nevertheless, that the unequal 
distribution of resources within African communities is not the only explanation of why 
in some regions large-scale military recruitment accompanied local reports of 
remunerative peasant agriculture. Some producers mw have taken up military employment 
as an additional means of raising capital, Since the length of contract to the army 
was normally only three months, it was possible for members of a community to go to 
work when their labour was not essential in the rural areas. The length of contract 
appears crucial; a.n absence of only three months could be incorporated relatively 
easily into a system of agricultural production. It was reported of the Basotho, for 
example, that 
They generally work in pairs. One man goes off to 
labour abroad, we will call him 'A', and 'B' remains 
at home and looks after the cattle and attends to the 
sowing of wheat, and, when 'A' returns in three 
months 'B' goes abroad to labour and 'At remains at 
home to attend to the sowing of mealies and kaffir 
corn. 'B! returns at the end of three months in 
time to reap his wheat and 'At will return in time to 
reap his crops. So that their methods of labour fit 
in greater facility for three months than for six 
months. (54) 
Two factors in particular may account for peasant producers attempting to secure the 
l a r ~ s t  possible income during the war. First, since the devastating losses of 
livestock as a result of the rinderpest epidemic it became an a priori concern of 
Africans to build up again their depleted herds; the wax provided a favourable 
opportunity to fulfil this ambition during its early stages when the livestock mar~et 
was buoyant m d  when many white fanners in threatened areas were willing to sell 
cattle to Africans rather than risk either supplying the enemy or having their livestock 
commandeered on credit. There are m a n y  reports of Africans using cash acquired by 
working for the military to purchase cattle, sheep and goats. (55) Secondly, during 
the wax a substantial increase took place not only in the price of livestock but in 
the price of consumption items such as cotton a d  woollen goods, implements and other 
small manufactures, owing to the dislocation of trade and high transport costs. 
African consumers, therefore, required a hieer cash income to buy these items, which 
by many v increasingly have been regarded as l1necessary" rather than simply 
lldiscretionaryn purchases. (56) 
African workers rwsponded in different ways to the conditions of work which 
they found to exist with the military. Many workers acknow1edg;ed that they were well 
satisfied with the wages earned, which for ox-drivers and leaders, classed by the army 
as skilled workers, rose to 90s a month, and for a ~lmall number of scouts to as hi& 
as 120s a month. The magistrate at Albany reported in 1901 that Africans who 
returned from military employment expressed themselves "well satisfied and loud in 
their praises of the way in which they were treated by the military authoritiesf1. (57) 
However, resentment rapidly spread among those workers in the former Republics 
conscripted into military employment. Desertion from the military compounds on the 
Witwatersrand remained a problem throughout the war, and in September 1901 fifteen 
workers at the Johmesburg store yard of the Imperial Military Railways struck work 
and refused to work any longer. (57) Complaints, too, were received from the African 
refugee camps, where protests were made against the system which virtually compelled 
a man to work if he wanted to eat. Two Africans at the Honingspruit camp in the 
Orange River Colony wrote that 
... the only food we can get is mealies and mealie 
meal, and this is not supplied to us free, but we 
have to purchase same with our own money. Meat we 
are still not able to get at any price, nor are we 
allowed to buy aqrthing at the shops at Honingspruit ... 
We humbly request Your Honour to do something for us 
otherwise we will all perish of hunger for we have 
no money to keep on buying food. ( 5 9 )  
Even among the better paid voluntary recruits dissatisfaction both with wage rates and 
the way workers were treated by their military employers erupted from time to time. 
Although the response of African workers in the Cape to military employment was 
immediate (within a short time of the establishment of the De Aar depot over 2,000 
were enlisted), in the Orange Free State Basotho workers were less enthusiastic 
initially because of the smaller wage - 40s instead of 60s - offered by the arrqy at 
Bloemfontein. When Sir Godfrey Lagden contacted the Basotho Paramount Chief, 
Lerothodi, he was told that it would be impossible to enlist the 2,000 workers required, 
because of the reduced wage: "... intercede for us ... chief for the wage to be 
Increasedw, Lerothodi replied. hgden urgently contacted the Commaxrder-in-Chief, Lord 
Roberts, who agreed that the wage offered at the Bloemfontein depot should be increased, 
and the workers requested by the Resident Commissioner were duly supplied. ( 60) 
Dissatisfaction among African workers largely centred on those employed by the remount 
department, who were generally paid lower wages than voluntary workers employed by 
other departments of the army. Workers at the remount depot at Pietermaritaburg,paid 
only 30s a month, refused to work in the areas where military operations were taking 
place unless they were paid 40s. When these workers returned to the depot those there 
also struck successfully for a wage rate of 40s. (61) Disillusionment with military 
employment was expressed by workers at the remount depots at Naauwpoort, Bowkerts Park 
and Worcester in the Cape. In May l9Ol a worker at the Naauwpoort depot complained of 
the high-handed treatment of the Chief Conductor, "a great enemy of Natives", and 
continued: 
We do not live in tents ... but in very dirty places, 
we get very scmty rations and generally go to sleep 
without food, we work with spades, we carry bags, etc., 
we work by day as well as by night without any mention 
of overtime pay, we work also on Sundays. (62) 
Complaints by workers of ill-treatment at Bowkerls Park and Worcester induced the Cape 
government to make an independent inspection of conditions at the depots. The report 
submitted to them made it clear that the principal grievance of the workers was their 
low rate of pay, though complaints were also made concerning their diet, which did not 
include vegetables because of scarcity, and the money owed to men who died while in 
military employment, which suggests that the mortality rate among workers may have 
been hi&, thou& no evidence was submitted relating to this. (63) 
During the final months of the South African War and immediately afterwards 
the argument was often advanced by employers, both from the mining and the agricultural 
communities, frustrated by their inability to recruit sufficient mskille8 labour, that 
the scale and conditions of military employment had disrupted the whole system of 
labour in South Africa. (64) There is evidence to suggest that allegations of Africans 
being 'Yull of money" after the war may not have been wholly unfounded, t h o w  this 
circulation of cash appears to have been the result, first, of African agriculturalists 
having taken advantage of the inflated price and demand for produce and livestock, and, 
secondly, the payment of militaqj receipts and claim for compensation. In Basutoland, 
the value of mealie exports rose from £11,450 in 1899-1900 to £29,104 in 1900-01, 
846,621 in 1901-02, and £55,014 in 1902-03; the value of Basutho ponies exported from 
the Colony in 1900-01 was £263,000, after which supplies became exhausted and breeding 
stocks irreparably damaged. (65) The Batlapin in the Taung reseme received 825,490 
from the military for the hire of their wagons (66), and in Bechuanaland Plwnert S 
Ikfeking relief column bought cattle worth £25,000 from the Bamangwato. (67) The 
increased purchasing power of Africans is also apparent. The value of dutiable goods 
imported into Basutoland rose from £85,527 in 1899-1900 to £145,474 in 1900-01, 
£230,680 in 1901-02, and though this figure fell to £191,019 in 1902-03 (probably as a 
result of the exodus of Afrikaner refugees returning to the Free State), the Resident 
Commissioner reported an 'lembamassing" number of applications for trading licences 
having been made throughout the year. (68) A branch of the Standard Bank opened at 
ikseru in July 1902. (69) The estimated value of goods imported into Natal for the 
"kaffir trade" increased from £159,910 in 1899 to £160,730 in 1900, 2230,180 in 1901, 
and £271,450 in 1902. (70) By the end of January 1903, £163,109 had been distributed 
among Africans in the Transvaal as payment for military receipts, and. £;L14,000 was set 
aside for compensation for livestock, grain, seeds and agricultural implements 
destroyed, stolen or requisitioned either by the Afrikaner or British forces without 
a receipt being issued. (71) As a result of the disarmament policy in the Transvaal, 
£60,989 was paid out in compensation to Africans for their surrendered arms and 
ammunition. (72) 
It is arguable, however, whether this circulation of money can be related to 
the scarcity of labour which followed the war, as many employers alleged, or that it 
represented great benefit to the vast majority of Africans. Since those best able 
to take advantage of the inflated demand and price for grain and livestock were 
Africaas who possessed herds large enough for a proportion of their stock to be aold, 
who already produced a grain surplus for sale on the market, and who were able to 
extend their area of cultivation either by agricultural improvement or having sufficient 
draught animals and additional cultivable land available, a large proportion of this 
money presumably circulated among Africans who were not dependent on the labour system 
to raise their cash requirements (thougih some may have taken employment after the 
rinderpest epidemic and during the war as an additional means of raising capital). The 
supply of labour from the former Republics may nevertheless have been influenced by the 
beneficial occupation by Africans of land normally cultivated by Afrikaner farmers 
absent on commando. (73) IUlitary receipts were haphazardly issued: the Native 
Commissioner in Waterberg believed that "for every receipt produced, three other 
receipts were duef1 (74), and in Heidelberg Africans calculated their total losses 
during the war to amount to £150,000, but military receipts accounted for only 
£4,733. (75) &my Africans handed in receipts to the military, whom it was found 
afterwards impossible to identify. (76) The continuing inflation of livestock prices, 
the short supply of cattle available for purchase at the end of the war, and the 
indebtedness into which a large number had S&, resulted in many Africans being 
unable to put the cash they received into productive we. Compensation claims were by 
no means paid in full: in the Transvaal African claims were assessed at £661,106, 
but only 17.25 per cent of this sum was actually paid out. (77) Even the money paid. 
for the surrender of arms and anmunition was considerably less than their market value. 
It appears that, though a number of Africans may have possessed the capital to avoid 
labouring in the inmediate aftemth of the war, their independence from the migrant 
labour system in the longer term was undermined. 
It is also unlikely that many fortunes were made by Africans from employment 
with the military. ALthough the remuneration for certain categories of workers was 
hi&, the length of contract to the military was normally only three months, and it 
yemained a constant problem for the amay that African workers rarely worked for longer 
than their contracts prescribed because of the arduousness and danger of the work - 
any Africans employed by the military who were captured by the Boers were invariably 
shot without trial. (78) Many of the best paid Africans, especially in intelligence 
work, were dram from among petty chiefs and headmen. The wages earned by workers 
also bought less as the war progz-essed because of the inflated price of grain aYLd 
cattle, which induced many to invest in small stock such as sheep and goats (the 
inflation of cattle prices varied in all regions of southern Africa from as little as 
£7415 to £10-g18 in Basutoland, to as high as £10 to £25-g30 in Bechuavlaland - prices 
not to be reached again until the 1960s. (79) Furthemore, the increase in labour 
migration after the war, even from those regions which did not suffer directly from 
devastation, suggests that the influence of military employment in afforcling workers 
greater independence from labouring was minimal: in 1903 the number of Natal Africans 
seeking work in the Trasvaal was greater than in any pre-war year (80); llbetween 
60,000 and 70,000" workers migrated from Basutoland in 1902-03 compased with 37,371 in 
1898-99 (81); labour migration from the Transkei increased from 61,034 in 1898 to 
66,695 in 1902, and 76,556 in 1903. (82) 
The new economic and political climate which the circumstance of war created, 
however, did play an important part in bringing about the labour shortage which 
imediately followed the conflict. The most seriously affected industry was gold 
mining, which in 1903 was able to recruit a work force only two-thirds of that which I 
it had employed in 1899, but the scarcity of workers was confined neither to the mining 
industry nor to the Transvaal. Farming experienced particular difficulties, and in 
some areas of South Africa agricultural output was cut back by the shortage of unskilled 
labour. (83) The new monthly wage rates of 30s-35s introduced b$r the Chamber of Mines 
in 1901 compared unfavourably not only with pre-war rates but also with the wages earn@& 
by a1mos"cevezy other category of labour in South Africa except farm workers. (84) 
During the immediate post-war economic boom it was relatively easy for Africans to find 
better paid employment in reparation and repatriation work, in public works entesgrises 
to improve road and rail communications, and at the ports. Whereas in 1897 the Chamber 
of Mines had been able to erforce wage reductions with very little effect on the supply 
of labour, largely because of the implications of the rinderpest epidemic an& the 
absence of alternative better paid work, in 1901-03 the demand for workers in South 
Africa appears to have been greater than the supply. Conditions of travel for African 
workers were especially difficult and hazardous during the final stages of the war and 
immediately afterwards,.since martial law restrictions were placed on the movement of 
Africans in view of the continuing guerrilla war,  and insufficient rolling stock was 
available afterwards for the required number of trains to transport migrant workers 
from Mozambique asld elsewhere to the Witwatersrand. (85) The much more sophisticated 
syatem of control over African workers introduced by the Milner administration also 
affected the labour supply (an issue neglected by Denoon in his study of the labour 
crisis). (86) During the 1890s many mining companies systematically recruited workers 
from each other by enrploying labour lltoutsll to procure newly arrived workers in the 
industrial area and to encourage desertions from the compounds of neighbouring mines, 
promising the workers better pay and conditions. Desertions became such a problem that 
in November 1898 the number of desertions reported by companies exceeded the number of 
workers legitimately dischaxged. (87) This system provided black workers on the Rand 
with the means to exercise selection in their ultimate choice of employer. After the 
wax, however, workers were confronted by a maximum average wage schedule, the 
establishment of a monopolistic recruiting agency, the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association, which was created with the intention of "rendering impossible in the 
future the indiscriminate competition, touting and traffic in Natives which in the 
past existed among the mining companies11 (88), and by an administration determined on 
regulating labour to a greater degree within the industrial area. The Milner regime 
extended the pass department, created a system of courts to deal with breaches of 
masters and servants legislation, introduced a scheme to register the fingsrprints of 
all mini% employees to help identify workers who deserted, and established regulations 
to prohibit mining companies recruiting workers in labour districts. The possibility 
of African workers exchanging employers to find the most congenial working conditions 
was therefore considerably reduced; the Native Commissioner at Pietezmaritzburg 
reported that one of the main reasons keeping Africans away from the mines was "the 
fact that they cannot choose the mine on which they want to work". (89) This 
circwnstance, together with the reduction of wages, produced a spate of protests by 
African workers on the Rand: strikes and mass desertions took place at the Consolidated 
Main Reef, Geldenhuis Estate, Unglaagte and Durban Roodepoort Mines, as well as at 
the Vereeniging Coal Mines and the Brakpan Electric Works. Thou& these protests left 
behind them no pement worker organization, the industrial unrest of 1901-02 
represents %he first evidence of substantial and well organized protest action by 
black workers on the Witwatersrand, almost two decades before the establishment of the 
first black trade union, the Industrial and Commercial WorkersVDnPon, in 1919. (go) 
Notes 
-
(1) D. Denoon, "Participation in the 'Beer Wart : Peoplets War, Peoplefs Non-War or 
Non-People1 S in B. A. Ogot, ed., War and Society in Africa wi on don, 1972), 
pp. 109-123. 
(2) Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission, Cd 1896 (XXXD) , 1904, p. 15. These 
figures are not necessarily precise, since before the war no uniform system of 
compiling labous,statistics existed; some mines returned men actually at work, 
others the total number of workers in the compounds, m d  a number of mines 
included workers employed by surface contractors. 
(3) C. Bun@, lf?lhe Bnergerrce and Decline of a South African Peasantryft, African 
Affairs, 71 (1972), pp. 369-388. 
(4) Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs (CBBKA) , G. 50-1900, p. 27. 
C. van Onselen, ffReactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africatf, Journal of African 
Histom, 13, 3 (1972)~ PP. 473-488. 
(5) Chamber of Mines, Annual Report for 1898, p. 453. 
(6) J. P. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within hi on don, 1899), p. 105. 
(7) Chamber of Mines, Annual Report for 1897, p. 107. 
(8) Further Correspondence Relating to Affairs in South Africa, Cd 43 (LVI), 1900, 
p. 167. Report by J. S. Marwick, Natal Native Agent, Johannesburg, October 1899. 
(9) The Standard and Diggers' News, 10.10.99. 
(10) Ibid., 3.11.99 and 20.11.99. 
(11) Further Correspondence, Cd 43, pp. 167-170. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Colonial Office Tiles, CO 417/309/1011, Commandant General British South Africa 
Company Police, J. S. Nicholson, to the Hi& Corrrmissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, 
13.11.99. 
(14) For the impact of the South African War on labour recruitment for the Rhodesian 
mines, see Charles van Onselen, Chibaro  ondo don, 1976), pp. 86-91. 
(15) Roberts Papers, Public Record Office, WO 105/14, ~/12/1, Telegrams, Colonial 
Kekewich to Lord Roberts, 20.1.1900, 10.2.1900. 
(16) e.g. CO 179/208/35796, Statement by Sebastian Msimang, 29.11.99. Stanford Papers, 
Jagger Library, University of Cape Town, ~(x) 11, George Dugmore to W. E. Stanford, 
19.10.99, CBBNA, G.50-1900, p. 27. 
(17) Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg, SNA 1/4/7, c1678/99, Codidential Minute, 
Magistrate Umvoti Division to Secretary for Native Affairs, 14.10.99. 
(18) CBBRA, G.50-1900, p. 27. 
(19) CO 179/216/6695, Secretary for Native Affairs, F. R. Moor, to the Secretary of 
*he Relief Committee, Pietemaritzburg, 8.12.99. 
(20) CO 179/211/11833, Rev. C. Johnson to Resident Magistrate Nqutu ~istrict , 1.3.1900. 
(21) CO 179/216/4527, H. R. Fox Bourne, Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, 
to the Colonial Secretary, J. Chamberlain, 12.2.1900. Colenso Papers, Natal 
Archives, Box 37 Pox Borne to Harriet Colenso, 26.1.1900. The Times, 26.1.1900 
and 10.2.1900. 
(22) CO 179/216/4527, Minutes by Chamberlain and other Colonial Office officials. 
(23) Ibid., Pox Bourrme to Chamberlain, 12.2.1900. 
(24) Cape Archives, Cape Town, ClvEC 3/8, 2/853~, Secretary to the Native Affairs 
Department to the Chief Nagistrate of the Transkei, 14.12.1900, and 2/821~, 
7.12.1900, CMT 3/60, 9/586, Resident Magistrate Butterworth to Chief Pkgistrate 
of the Transkei, 24.8.1900. CBBNA, G.50-1900, p. 41. 
(25) Unfortunately, no comprehensive figures for the number of African workers 
employed by the British Ar~l~r were maintained, ajnd it is impossible to use l 
government statistics of the number of workers leaving particular districts to 
build up a picture of military recruitment, since the Ariny often enlisted workers 
independently of local magistrates. It is unlikely, however, that during most 
periods of the war the British Army employed fewer than 50,000 African workers. 
(26) Transvaal Archives Depot, Leyds-Argief, 781(i), "Gebruik van zoogenaaade wilde 
volksstannnenl~, rapport van Kapt . Ram en Luit . Thomson, n. d. , pp. 66-73. 
S. B. Spies, l1Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics, January 
1900-May 190211, University of the Witwatersrand, PhD thesis, 1973, p. 26. 
J. H. Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweeife Vryheidsoorlos: in Suid-Afrika, 
1899-1902, Vol. 1 (~retoria, 1969), pp. 36-37, 132. 
(27) The Standard and Diamrsl News, 25.11.99. 
(28) Ibid., 20.10.99. 
(29) Ibid. , 11 .l .1900. 
(30) Ibid., 25.10.99, 3.1.1900, 6.3.1900, 21.3.1900. 
(31) Denoon, OP. cit., pp. 114-1x5. 
(32) Royal Engineers Institute, Detailed Histom of the Railways in the South Africa 
War, 1899-1902 (chatham, 1904)~ pp. 257-262. 
(33) CBBNA, G.25-1902, p. 7. Free State Archives, Bloemfontein, C(S)O 81, 20/02, 
A. E. Tarry, General Manager South African General Agency Ltd., to Military 
Commander, Bloemfontein, 28.12.01. 
(34) Transvaal Archives Depot, MGP 24, 3345/00, Tel. Military Governor to 
0. C. Rietfontein, 18.9.1900. 
(35) M W  1, 08/00, Capt. A. R. Hoskins to OC Supplies, 9.6.1900; MG'P 63, 605/01, 
Superintendent of Natives to Director of Supplies, 8.2.01. 
(36) Spies, op. cit., p. 235. 
1 ' (37) This figure is taken from the census conducted by the British administration 
after the war, Transvaal!Departmental Reports: Native Affairs Department, 1904. 
(38) Transvaal Administration Reports for 1902: Final Report of the work performed 
by the Native Refugee Deparknent from June 1901 to December 1902, p. 1. 
(39) C(S)O 86, 358/02, de Lotbiniere to lvlajor hold-Adams, 18.1.02. Spies, op. cit., 
PP* 355356. 
(40) E. Hobhouse, The B m t  of the War and Where it Fell  ondo don, 1902)~ pp. 350-355. 
(41) CBBEA, G.52-1901, p. 16. 
(42) Ibid., p. 21. 
nnn n n n n n n 
m m m  m m n n m cn 
R) I-' 

































R ) ?  X?  





























R "  
5 
Z E  
6 4 
g -  
a g  


















N  U' 
















? % g  
d- d- 
o P W  $"a 
3 g-  
R)!3q y m  m 
# 0 
y(D cn 
0 ,! P 
I-' P m  
? 8 
Y ' 2  
S 





P S r 
r d- 
a I-'. 4 
M (D 
%- 8 2 
2 E g ' 
U 
ct (D 
0  'd 





P :: 3. g 
m (D 
d- Y 
E is $* 





g 5  
Iv 
0  R) 
'-'h S E 
cl. m 





















c 3 P t - l  $ .C"$  
- Y' :  
YlG;;g 
X8 3 












































Y O  3' $. Y P' 
"2 g 5 
cow """ 'do 
F F3 
O P &  ? F +  
I-' - 
V) 8 .!F' 
.. 




P, m w  8" 
..I-' P 
W 




l 0  ca 
I-' P I-' C)  
r t  
d- I-'. 












P.W Cd B" 
= G  !3 
S 4 d -  z h4 
(D W 
- P O  
0  (D 
S d - m  q& - 
P- m - 
U. 
n nnnnnnn n hn  
W W  W W W W W P P  
m u  P W N I - ' O W O ,  P -4 P P 
w w  W W W W V U W  W 
m W  

















































































































































































I - ' =  
'd 
8 F K 5  
'cl S I-' 
d-(D a r  
0  P. 
c+ CD 
'd 0 o p  
P, 0'0 
' d c D  I 
(D 




'a P, ?'g ," 
Y 0  
Y'w E? 




P g;: d-a 
5 3  
P Y O  
Y 'd 
d- P. E! 
0  C)  (D 
Y 
Y G 1 - 4  8 2.2 
w a g  l% 
d- E "  
k 2 e G.. 
\D 82 P 
'd UI 
S w'd  $ 8  +? 
m o 
g 3 g  
d- 6" ( D V %  
Y 3- P m  
5 S E  W  
@ ! l 
Y m  I-' 
Y &\D 






c E.. E 5 
c a d -  
I-' P. P, g" I-' g b y  'd 
W 
W W d -  
'd, Fg 
3 2 8 5  
f w 
? W ( D  


























I-' w d - 0  W C +  o m g;.i 
0 d- 
.. g I-' e w  
'3 m s p  
8 ~ ; R N  
m m \  8 e:?.lWg 
a P O &  
' d w w r o  
; $ " S 4  
"F 'P 0 (D 
o r  Yg 
Y Pad-  I - ' B ~ ~ ~  (D (D 
g $  K "  













to 1895-1923tt, University of Edinburgh P1?D thesis, 1973, p. 191. 
Basutoland Annual Report for 1902-02, Cd 1768-13 (XLV)~ 1904, p. 4. 
Basutolavrd Annual Report for 1901-02, Cd 1388-4 (XLIIL) , 1903, p. 27. 
Compiled from Natal Blue Books on Native Affairs, 189%1902. 
Transvaal Administration Reports for 1903: Native Affairs Dept., p. Ag. 
Transvaal Administration Reports for 1902: Native Affairs Dept., p. A.27. 
SNA 13, 1569/02, Native Commissioner Pretoria District to Secretary for Native 
Affairs, 26.10.02. Transvaal Archives Depot, Lt. G. 122, 101/26, Native 
Commissioner Waterberg District to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26.10.02. 
Tmsvaal Administration Reports for 1902: Native Affairs Dept., p. A18. 
Ibid p. A22. 
.' 
SNA 15, 2075/02 de Lotbiniere to Sir Godfrey Lagden, 22.10.02. 
Denoon, op. cit . , p. 116. ' 
Public Record Office WO 32/8085-88, Lord Kitchener to the Under-Secretary of 
State for War, 22.11.01-21.3.02. Cape Colony Archives AG 2071, "Angle-Boer War 
correspondence relating to the shooting and outrages on Natives,: 1899-1902tt. 
Parsons, op. cit. 
S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion (Oxford, 1970), p. 135. 
Basutoland Annual Report for 1899-1900, Cd 431-5 (m), 1901, p. 22; 1902-03, 
P* 15. 
(82) Report of the Transvaal Labpm Commission, p. 22. 
South African Native Affairs Commission, Minutes of Evidence (SANAC) , Vol. 5, 
S. H. Roberbs, Chief Inspector Native Locations, Queenstown, p. 75. 
Because of the scarcity of agricultural labour immediately after the war, faxmers 
were induced to pay wages in advance (sometimes in the form of livestock) and to 
increase the land set aside for their workers1 use in order to secure a reliable 
work force. 
The conditions of travel for black workers on the railways have generally been 
overlooked. African trains were classified as goods, rather than passenger, 
trains. It was the normal practice for traine carrying workers to stop to allow 
goods trains to proceed, with the result that workers were compelled to endm 
long journeys in closed trucks with no sanitary facilities. The congestion of 
the Transvaal railway system, the shortage of rolling stock causing the terrible 
overcrowding of workers in available trucks, and further delays in the delivery 
of workers from Braamfontein station to particular mines, exacerbated the problem 
after the war. One in eight mining recruits were found physically unfit 
immediately to begin work. 
D. Denoon, "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6", Journal of African Histoq, VIII, 
3 (1967), PP. 481-494- 
Chamber of Mines, Annml Report for 1898, p. 78. See also, Alan Jeeves, "The 
Control of Ugratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Xruger 
and Milnerv, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2, 1 (1975)~ pp. 3-29. 
Chamber of Mines, Annual Re~0r-b for 1900 and 1901, p. 111. 
Lt.G. 121, 110/5, Report by Native Commissioner, Pietersburg, n.d. 
P. Warwick, "Black Industrial Protest on the Witwatersrand, lgOI-O2", Centre for 
Southern African Studies, University of York, 1975. 
I am grateful to Alec -in and William Beinart for commenting on an earlier draft of 
this paper. 
